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The Scope of Tribal Immunity in
Real Property Disputes
Sean Frazzette†
Native American tribes are sovereign nations with some degree of sovereign
immunity. The exact contours of that immunity are often in flux. While the Supreme
Court has established the confines of tribal immunity in cases involving torts, taxation, and contracts, it has avoided determining the doctrine’s application to cases
involving real property. Recently, in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v Lundgren, the
Court dismissed the common notion that prior precedent mandates an in rem versus
in personam distinction but refused to answer whether tribes can claim sovereign
immunity in in rem actions against tribal land. By analyzing the history of tribal
sovereignty, land ownership, and immunity from suit, this Comment argues that
absent explicit congressional action, tribes can claim sovereign immunity in suits
involving any form of tribal property. Only tribes themselves and the legislative
branch of the federal government have the constitutional authority to alter these
contours.
The dissent in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe introduced a relevant legal concern:
the immovable property exception to sovereign immunity. But an analogy to the historical treatment of foreign nations quickly disposes of this concern. The concurrence
proposed a policy concern: the potential for sovereign immunity to be used as a sword
rather than a shield. This concern is readily refuted, however. The history of sovereign immunity in the United States, especially with regard to foreign nations and
Native tribes—as well as the best interest of the tribes—side with broad immunity
from suit. Under this Comment’s expansive approach to tribal immunity, Congress
maintains its role as the sole political branch that may adjust tribal immunity,
and—more importantly—tribes maintain the right to determine their own sovereignty and invoke their own immunity, protecting land that the government has so
consistently taken from them throughout this country’s history.
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INTRODUCTION
Sovereign states have long been immune from suit. Although
sovereign immunity in its various forms has occasionally been
maligned as “beyond the pale”1 or even unconstitutional,2 the doctrine has (so far) survived the test of time.3 But different sovereigns have different immunities. Under US law, foreign nation
immunity, state immunity, and territorial immunity are each
varied in scope and have developed in different manners.4 Moreover, Native tribes are not foreign countries, states, or territories;
rather, courts most frequently view them as “domestic dependent
nations.”5 What this title means for both their sovereignty and
their immunity from suit has been ever evolving. Over the years,
1
Michigan v Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US 782, 831–32 (2014) (Ginsburg
dissenting) (arguing that both tribal and state sovereign immunity have become “immoderate” and will prove to lack “staying power”).
2
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan L Rev 1201, 1203–
16 (2001) (explaining that there is no constitutional justification for any form of sovereign
immunity and arguing it may in fact be unconstitutional under several theories, including
originalism).
3
See, for example, Franchise Tax Board of California v Hyatt, 139 S Ct 1485, 1499
(2019) (“[T]he States’ sovereign immunity is a historically rooted principle embedded in
the text and structure of the Constitution.”); Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 785
(“[A]bsent [congressional] abrogation (or a waiver), Indian tribes have immunity even
when a suit arises from off-reservation commercial activity.”).
4
See, for example, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub L No 94-583, 90
Stat 2891 (1976), codified as amended in various sections of Title 28 (codifying foreign nation immunity with limited exceptions); Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 11–14 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment makes clear that states have maintained immunity
from suit); Porto Rico v Rosaly y Castillo, 227 US 270, 274 (1913) (noting that “the incorporated Territories have always been held to possess an immunity from suit”).
5
Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 17 (1831); Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 788.
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the Supreme Court has established the confines of tribal immunity in cases involving torts,6 taxation,7 and contracts;8 however, it
has avoided determining the doctrine’s application to cases involving real property. For two decades, some courts applied a misguided interpretation of County of Yakima v Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation9 to limit tribal immunity
to in personam cases but not in rem cases.10 Other courts rejected
County of Yakima’s applicability and found tribal immunity applied in both types of cases.11 When the Supreme Court finally
confronted the question in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v
Lundgren,12 Justice Neil Gorsuch confirmed that County of Yakima should not be interpreted as the law governing real property
disputes, but then deemed that to be “work enough for the day.”13
Instead of a new rule, he offered only a truism: “Determining the

6
See Lewis v Clarke, 137 S Ct 1285, 1289 (2017) (“That an employee was acting
within the scope of his employment at the time the tort was committed is not, on its own,
sufficient to bar a suit against that employee on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.”).
7
See Oklahoma Tax Commission v Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 US 505, 507 (1991) (“We conclude that under the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity, the State may not tax such sales to Indians, but remains free to collect taxes
on sales to nonmembers of the tribe.”).
8
See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc, 523 US 751, 760
(1998) (“Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve
governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation. Congress has not abrogated this immunity, nor has petitioner waived it, so the immunity governs this case.”).
9
502 US 251 (1992).
10 County of Yakima interpreted the General Allotment Act of 1887, Pub L No 49119, 24 Stat 388 (1887), codified as amended at 25 USC § 331 et seq, as allowing “an ad
valorem tax on reservation land patented in fee pursuant to the Act, but [not allowing] the
county to enforce its excise tax on sales of such land.” County of Yakima, 502 US at 270.
The Court centered its holding on a textualist analysis of the General Allotment Act, which
permits “‘taxation of . . . land,’ not ‘taxation with respect to land,’ ‘taxation of transactions
involving land,’ or ‘taxation based on the value of land.’” County of Yakima, 502 US at 269
(alteration in original); see also generally General Allotment Act, 24 Stat 388. Given both
the narrow holding of the case and the majority’s strict reading of the Act’s text, it would
not be prudent to expand County of Yakima beyond the distinction of taxing fee land
within reservations versus taxing the sale of that land.
11 Compare Cass County Joint Water Resource District v 1.43 Acres of Land in Highland Township, 643 NW2d 685, 691–94 (ND 2002) (citing County of Yakima, then holding
that “the State may exercise territorial jurisdiction over the land, including an in rem
condemnation action, and the Tribe’s sovereign immunity is not implicated”), with Hamaatsa, Inc v Pueblo of San Felipe, 388 P3d 977, 985 (NM 2016) (determining that “in the
context of tribal sovereign immunity there exists no meaningful distinction between in
rem and in personam claims”).
12 138 S Ct 1649 (2018).
13 Id at 1652, 1655.
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limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes is a grave
question.”14
Due to tribes’ unique and ambiguous status as domestic dependent nations, courts and scholars often focus on comparing
tribes to other forms of sovereigns.15 Some form of sovereign immunity applies to any state—whether a foreign nation, one of the
several states, or an Indian tribe—that exercises sovereignty.
Moreover, the doctrine is generally a common law doctrine, with
exceptions like the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act16 (FSIA).
Accordingly, determining its applicability is an exercise in tracking case law. Thus, the ways in which courts have dealt with foreign nations, states, and territories should shed some light on
how they should deal with tribes in the future.
Justice Gorsuch was not wrong to call the question grave. The
history of tribal land in the United States is one of theft.17 In 1823,
the Supreme Court held that the United States maintained “the
exclusive right of extinguishing the title” of Native land.18 In the
1880s, when the United States began allotting reservation land
to individual Natives, tribal landholdings were around 140 million acres;19 50 years later, that number was around 50 million
acres.20 By the 1930s, when the government repudiated allotment,
around 27 million acres had been transferred to non-Native ownership.21 Today, more than 56.2 million acres of Native land exist,
14

Id at 1654.
See, for example, Gregory Ablavsky, Sovereign Metaphors in Indian Law, 80 Mont
L Rev 11, 12 (2019) (“[T]he status of Native nations within federal law has almost always
been defined with reference to other sovereigns.”). See also id at 12–20 (explaining the comparisons to foreign nations); id at 20–27 (same to states); id at 27–39 (same to territories).
16 Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976), codified as amended in various sections of
Title 28.
17 See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132
Harv L Rev 1787, 1796–97 (2019) (“From the Founding, the national government has had
a direct hand in the violent dispossession of Native peoples, the internment of Natives into
reservation camps, and efforts to ‘kill the Indian and save the man’ by forcing Indian children into boarding schools run by the federal government.”).
18 Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 588 (1823).
19 Allotment was a government practice aimed at forcing assimilation and ending
Native sovereignty. The federal government granted land to individual tribe members to
be held in trust by the United States for twenty-five years, after which it would be converted to a fee simple title, and the landholders would be granted US citizenship. The
policy was eventually altered to allow the secretary of the interior to issue the fee patent
at any time. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz St L J 1, 10–12 (1995).
20 Marc Slonim, Indian Country, Indian Reservations, and the Importance of History
in Indian Law, 45 Gonzaga L Rev 517, 522 (2009).
21 Royster, 27 Ariz St L J at 12 (cited in note 19). In 1934, Congress passed the Indian
Reorganization Act, Pub L No 73-383, 48 Stat 984, codified at 25 USC § 461 et seq, which
15
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all of which are held in trust by the United States.22 As Justice
Gorsuch noted, the scope of tribal immunity in cases involving
real property “will affect all tribes, not just the one before us.”23 A
poorly thought-out rule could only exacerbate the dispossession of
land held by Native Americans.
This Comment argues that Native tribes, absent congressional waiver, should be able to claim immunity to suit in any in
rem actions involving real property.24 Unless Congress acts, tribal
immunity will remain at its peak. And although the Court voiced
two major concerns with tribal immunity in this context, both can
be resolved within this existing legal framework. To this end, this
Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and its various limits. To understand tribal
immunity, one must first understand the origins and scope of sovereign immunity more broadly. Part II then focuses on the law
surrounding tribal land, tribal sovereignty, and tribal immunity,
culminating in the undecided question presented in Upper Skagit
Indian Tribe: May tribes claim sovereign immunity in suits involving their real property? Part III answers this question. While
advocating for nearly unlimited tribal immunity might appear
somewhat radical, this solution provides the protection necessary
to maintain tribal land and avoids the legal and practical issues
suggested by the Court. Additionally, an expansive view of in rem
immunity is more consistent with the general principles of tribal
immunity. The Conclusion summarizes the contributions of this
prohibited further allotment, extended trust relationships indefinitely, and authorized the
secretary of the interior to take new land into trust and add land to reservations. Royster,
27 Ariz St L J at 17 (cited in note 19).
22 This was the estimated amount at the time of publication. See Frequently Asked
Questions (US Department of the Interior, Indian Affairs), archived at
https://perma.cc/H3G4-ZLMN. Recently, in McGirt v Oklahoma, 2020 WL 3848063 (US),
the Supreme Court confirmed that a portion of Oklahoma—which had not been treated
like a reservation for decades—has actually remained one. See id at *22 (“The federal
government promised the Creek a reservation in perpetuity. . . . Congress has never withdrawn the promised reservation.”). This decision should add approximately nineteen million acres to this total. See Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Toe Hard Line in
Affirming Reservation Status for Eastern Oklahoma (SCOTUSblog, July 9, 2020), archived
at https://perma.cc/G5NF-AL3P.
23 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1654.
24 In rem actions are those directly against property and enforceable against the
world, while in personam actions are against another person and enforceable only against
that person. The former can be against any form of property, but this Comment focuses
only on those against real property, such as adverse-possession and quiet-title claims. See
Henry Campbell Black, Treatise of the Law of Judgments Including the Doctrine of Res
Judicata § 792 (West 1891).
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Comment and addresses its future implications as tribes continually attempt to repossess their land.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: DOCTRINE AND LIMITATIONS
While the in rem immunity question left unanswered in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe is the impetus for this Comment, a thorough understanding of sovereign immunity is necessary to come
to a satisfying solution.25 The doctrine has its origins in the common law. Limitations to its scope could therefore come from the
government altering the law by statute26 or by a judge-made exception. For the purposes of this Comment, the most relevant example of a judge-made rule is the immovable property exception,
which holds that any immovable property—that is, real property
and any structures attached thereto—is not subject to sovereign
immunity when it is acquired within another sovereign. It is this
exception that Justice Clarence Thomas cites in his Upper Skagit
Indian Tribe dissent as the clear answer to the question of tribal
immunity’s scope as applied to real property.27
But to answer the question posed by the Upper Skagit Indian
Tribe majority, the applicability of the immovable property exception to tribes is “more complicated than [Justice Thomas] promises,”28 and the government has not clarified the scope of tribal
immunity by statute. A brief overview of the case law developing
sovereign immunity is therefore useful. Although it remains a legally distinct doctrine, tribal immunity shares common principles
with other forms of sovereign immunity. Consequently,

25 There are two ways to conceptualize sovereign immunity. One could consider
whether a sovereign is incapable of being haled into its own courts, or one could consider
whether a sovereign could be brought into another sovereign’s courts. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc, 523 US 751, 760–61 (1998) (Stevens dissenting). An individual tribe’s domestic law determines a tribal court’s jurisdiction, while US
law determines the immunity it affords other sovereigns in federal court. See id. Individual tribes can and do handle their jurisdictional scope differently. See Catherine T. Struve,
Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 Ariz St L J 137, 155–61 (2004). Due to both the
tribes’ greater authority in their own courts and the potentially vast differences in rules,
this Comment only confronts the jurisdiction of US federal and state courts.
26 A common example is waiver, which is when the government limits its own immunity. See, for example, Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 2674 (“The United States
shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall
not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”).
27 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1657 (Thomas dissenting).
28 Id at 1654 (majority).
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understanding the doctrine’s development on the whole is beneficial to understanding its scope for tribes.
This Part proceeds in two steps. First, it explains how the
various sovereigns recognized by the United States are granted
immunity. Second, it discusses how the immovable property exception has been applied to these sovereigns.
A. Sources of Sovereign Immunity
The Constitution establishes the federal government and
acknowledges the existence of four additional potential sovereigns. The Commerce Clause names “foreign Nations, . . . the several States, and [ ] the Indian Tribes,”29 and Article IV discusses
territories.30 Part II of this Comment will address the sovereignty
of Native tribes, but this Part describes the immunities of the
other four cognizable sovereigns. Tribal immunity, while distinct
in its boundaries and history, shares some key features with these
other forms of immunity.
The precise origins of federal sovereign immunity are up for
debate. The system likely began in England due to the intricacies
of the feudal justice system before eventually being repurposed as
an extension of the divine right of kings.31 William Blackstone
promulgated the latter theory, and the phrase “the king can do no
wrong” was born.32 Even though the United States has an express
ban on granting titles of nobility,33 many presumed that the US
government maintained immunity upon its independence.34 Indeed, when pressed on the issue, the Court has found a “universally received opinion [ ] that no suit can be commenced or

29

US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3.
US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States.”). The very language of Article IV suggests that territories are not their
own sovereigns, and the Supreme Court has adopted that interpretation. See Puerto Rico
v Sanchez Valle, 136 S Ct 1863, 1876 (2016) (holding that “the Commonwealth and the
United States are not separate sovereigns”). Nevertheless, the territories do enjoy some
immunity from suit. See note 4 and text accompanying notes 54–59.
31 George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13
La L Rev 476, 477–79 (1953).
32 William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 238–41
(Oxford 1765–1769).
33 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 8.
34 See Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 541, 548 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob
E. Cooke, ed) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent.”) (emphasis omitted).
30
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prosecuted against the United States.”35 The Court has never offered a compelling reason for sovereign immunity’s durability in
a country without a feudal system or an infallible monarch, but
rather admits to the puzzle: “[T]he principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated
as an established doctrine.”36
State immunity was not as clear at the time of the Founding.
During the debates over the ratification of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton assured the public that immunity “is now enjoyed
by the government of every state in the union,”37 but others were
not so certain. Some feared that the Constitution created only one
sovereign—the federal government—and that the Constitution
may even have explicitly permitted suits against states.38 Article III of the Constitution directly references controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State.”39 While one possible
interpretation of this clause permitted jurisdiction only when a
state consents,40 the Court decided otherwise in Chisholm v Georgia.41 This led to the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment,
which has been interpreted as confirming the existence of state
immunity against suits by residents of other states. But it did not
create state immunity.42 Rather, it merely clarified that “the
35

Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 411–12 (1821).
United States v Lee, 106 US (16 Otto) 196, 207 (1882). But see Nevada v Hall, 440
US 410, 415 (1979) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Franchise Tax Board
of California v Hyatt, 139 S Ct 1485 (2019):
36

The King’s immunity rested primarily on the structure of the feudal system and
secondarily on a fiction that the King could do no wrong.
We must, of course, reject the fiction. It was rejected by the colonists when they
declared their independence from the Crown.
37

Federalist 81, in The Federalist at 549 (cited in note 34).
Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
Harv L Rev 1559, 1581 (2002).
39 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
40 Nelson, 115 Harv L Rev at 1587 (cited in note 38).
41 2 US (2 Dall) 419, 461 (1793) (finding “nothing against, but much in favour of, the
jurisdiction of this Court over the State of Georgia”) (emphasis omitted).
42 Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 11 (1890) (“[The Eleventh Amendment] did not in
terms prohibit suits by individuals against the States, but declared that the Constitution
should not be construed to import any power to authorize the bringing of such suits.”). The
exact meaning of the Eleventh Amendment is a contentious topic in legal academia. Some
say it merely overruled Chisholm; others say it applies only to cases involving diversity
jurisdiction; and still others support the Court’s continuous extratextual expansion of
Eleventh Amendment protections to cases involving admiralty and suits brought by foreign nations and Native tribes. For a brief summary of these competing ideas, see David
A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 Harv L Rev 1, 50–
52 (2015). This Comment does not offer an independent analysis of the Eleventh
38
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States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.”43 State immunity is not
absolute, however—even when the state itself has refused consent to be sued. For example, the Court has made clear that Congress may abrogate state immunity when enacting legislation for
the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 Additionally,
for forty years, courts allowed for private suits against states in
different states’ courts.45 Such nonconsensual suits, however,
have recently been deemed unconstitutional.46
Before the FSIA, foreign nation immunity was a common law
doctrine centered around deference to the executive branch. The
common law came from customary international law, which
stated that a sovereign could not be haled into another sovereign’s
court, and was recognized by Chief Justice John Marshall early
in this country’s history: “A foreign sovereign is not understood as
intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with
his dignity, and the dignity of his nation.”47 Even if framed as traditional common law, foreign nation immunity was clearly a matter of comity from the US government, specifically the executive
branch.48 That is, the president and secretary of state would determine if diplomatic negotiation was preferable to litigation, and
courts, rather than assuming jurisdiction, would defer to their
judgment.49 The FSIA was passed in 1976 to remove the discretionary application of sovereign immunity.50 The FSIA confirmed
that, “[s]ubject to existing international agreements” made before
Amendment. Instead, it accepts the Court’s recent rationale that the amendment did not
create state immunity, but merely confirmed preconstitutional ideas of the doctrine and
overruled Chisholm.
43 Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 713 (1999).
44 Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 456 (1976). See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v
Florida, 517 US 44, 59 (1996).
45 See Hall, 440 US at 426–27 (holding that state immunity in other states may be
“wise policy” if provided voluntarily by states, but, if imposed by a federal court as a constitutional matter, “would constitute the real intrusion on the sovereignty of the States—
and the power of the people—in our Union”).
46 Franchise Tax Board, 139 S Ct at 1499 (holding that “historical evidence show[s]
a widespread preratification understanding that States retained immunity from private
suits, both in their own courts and in other courts”).
47 The Schooner Exchange v M’Faddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
48 See Verlinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 486 (1983).
49 See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 US 578, 586–87 (1943).
50 See Verlinden B.V., 461 US at 488 (noting that the FSIA was passed, among other
things, to avoid “case-by-case diplomatic pressures” and ensure litigants were receiving
due process).
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the time of the passing of the act, foreign nations were not subject
to the jurisdiction of US courts.51 There are specific exceptions
made to the general rule, the most relevant of which are if the
foreign nation waives the immunity52 or if “rights in immovable
property situated in the United States are in issue.”53
Lastly, territories have retained common law immunity from
suit. According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, the source of
the immunity is “not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory” but rather the doctrine comes from “the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”54 Furthermore, a territory has the ability to “waive its exemption” if
desired, just like any other sovereign.55 But Justice Holmes did
not stop there. He gave a full-throated endorsement of sovereign
immunity even for partial sovereigns because they “originate and
change at their will the law of contract and property,” which is
where their citizens “derive their rights.”56 He made clear that
“Congress might intervene, just as in the case of a State the Constitution does,” but regardless “the rights that exist are not created by Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of certain limitations of power.”57 Thus, Congress has plenary power
over the territories, and the territories lack sovereignty “in the
full sense.”58 But despite this, territorial immunity still remains
at its strongest, unless Congress intervenes.59
B. The Immovable Property Exception
When unencumbered by a statutory provision, immunity
from suit is subject only to the judge-made exceptions that have

51

28 USC § 1604.
See 28 USC § 1605(a)(1).
53 28 USC § 1605(a)(4).
54 Kawananakoa v Polyblank, 205 US 349, 353 (1907). This holding only makes sense
when a state is sued in its own courts. See, for example, Hall, 440 US at 416 (noting that
Justice Holmes’s “explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may
be sued in its own courts without its consent,” but when a state is haled into another
sovereign’s court, the immunity “must be found either in an agreement, express or implied,
between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter of comity”).
55 Kawananakoa, 205 US at 353.
56 Id.
57 Id at 353–54.
58 Id at 353.
59 Kawananakoa, 205 US at 353.
52
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developed through the common law. The most notable of these for
the purposes of this Comment is the immovable property exception. The exception itself, which Justice Thomas called “hornbook
law almost as long as there have been hornbooks,”60 was quaintly
invoked by scholar Cornelius van Bynkershoek: “Even if we
should refrain from the arrest of a prince on account of the inviolability of his person, who could say that the property of a prince
in a foreign country is equally inviolable?”61 Simply stated, immovable property acquired by a sovereign, but located within a
different sovereign, is not immune from suit. Rather, it is to be
treated the same as any other private property located within a
sovereign’s jurisdiction. This is because “property ownership is
not an inherently sovereign function”—instead, it is a private
function.62 But the history of the immovable property exception’s
application in US law is not so straightforward.
In the 1812 case The Schooner Exchange v M’Faddon,63 the
Court recognized the immovable property exception in its very
first acknowledgment of foreign state immunity: “A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction[;]
he may be considered as so far laying down the prince, and assuming the character of a private individual.”64 It now remains
alive and well as applied to foreign state immunity, having been
codified in the FSIA as follows: “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case . . . in which . . . rights in immovable property
situated in the United States are in issue.”65 But despite the dicta
in The Schooner Exchange, courts never actually invoked the immovable property exception against a foreign state.66 Instead, the

60

Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1657 (Thomas dissenting).
Cornelius van Bynkershoek, De Foro Legatorum Liber Singularis: A Monograph
on the Jurisdiction over Ambassadors in Both Civil and Criminal Cases 22 (Oxford 1946)
(originally published 1721).
62 Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v City of New York, 551 US 193,
199–200 (2007).
63 11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
64 Id at 145.
65 28 USC § 1605(a) (emphasis added).
66 Fredric Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin,
Meaning and Effect, 3 Yale J Intl L 1, 33 (1976) (“No . . . judicial denial of immunity appears to have been expressly based on [immovable property] grounds.”). Given that Congress passed the FSIA in 1976, Fredric Alan Weber’s article should reflect comprehensive
research on the immovable property exception before the codification of foreign nation
61
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scope of foreign state immunity depended on the executive
branch. Ordinarily, the State Department “requested immunity
in all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns,” until 1952
when the secretary of state determined private actions by foreign
parties should not always be barred.67 Even after this determination, “[o]n occasion, political considerations led to suggestions of
immunity in cases where immunity would not have been available” if the immovable property exception applied.68 If the foreign
nation had not engaged with the State Department in a given
suit, then courts would make decisions with deference to any prior
negotiations by the State Department.69 This occasionally created
inconsistent rulings, which caused Congress to intervene and
pass the FSIA.70 Historically, therefore, the rule was not that
suits over immovable property were permitted, but rather that
the State Department provided an ad hoc determination of the
scope of a foreign nation’s immunity.
In contrast, courts have unequivocally adopted the exception
within state sovereignty. In Georgia v City of Chattanooga,71 the
state of Georgia owned a railroad within Tennessee and sought to
enjoin the city of Chattanooga from appropriating some of the
land.72 The Court rejected Georgia’s claim of sovereign immunity
over the land because the state “acquired land in another State
for the purpose of using it in a private capacity.”73 The justification for denying state sovereign immunity was that the “terms on
which Tennessee gave Georgia permission to acquire and use the
immunity. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v Lundgren,
No 17-387, *8 (US filed Mar 12, 2018) (available on Westlaw at 2018 WL 1326147).
67 Verlinden B.V., 461 US at 486–87 (emphasis added). With the codification of the
exception, however, the Court has altered its range. For example, it was found to apply in
tax liens against the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations because a tax lien
implicates a “quintessential right[ ] of property ownership” and is therefore within the
immovable property exception without being an action against the property itself. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 551 US at 198–99. Consequently, the exception is understood to now apply whenever the property rights are at issue, even if the
property itself is not directly implicated. But see Fagot Rodriguez v Republic of Costa Rica,
297 F3d 1, 11 (1st Cir 2002) (“[P]urely compensatory rights, without more, are insufficient
to sustain jurisdiction under the immovable property exception.”). Nevertheless, these expansions all occurred after the passage of the FSIA, and thus are not contextually relevant
for this Comment.
68 Verlinden B.V., 461 US at 487.
69 Id at 487–88.
70 Id at 488.
71 264 US 472 (1924).
72 Id at 478.
73 Id at 479–80.
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land” constituted Georgia’s implicit consent to be susceptible to
condemnation proceedings.74
The doctrine does not appear to have ever been applied to territorial immunity, nor, as will be seen, tribal immunity.
Theoretically, the immovable property exception is straightforward: sovereigns acquire property as if they are private persons. Nevertheless, its place in US law is much muddier. While a
state cannot acquire land within another state and claim immunity, a foreign nation, until the passage of the FSIA, very often
could have. The exception may be found in a hornbook, but its
application is varied, and may for some sovereigns only be found
within policy memoranda at the State Department.
The developments of the above forms of immunity are each
distinct in some manner from tribal immunity, and, accordingly,
the corresponding applicability of the immovable property exception is in question. But these concepts are nevertheless related
and will inform the discussion of tribal sovereignty and immunity
below.
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND IMMUNITY
What does this all mean for tribes? They “are subject to plenary control by Congress,” but as domestic dependent nations,
tribes retain whatever sovereignty they do possess until Congress
exercises its plenary control to the contrary.75 The strength of that
sovereignty has historically been in flux, but this Comment contends that it has gradually grown stronger over time. One scholar
has argued that, by basing this fluctuation on the uniqueness of
tribal sovereignty (as opposed to other forms of sovereignty), the
Court “has provided a powerful and ongoing ideological tool in
constructing U.S. colonialism over Native peoples.”76 Recently,
however, the Court has seemed more inclined to recognize tribes’
sovereignty.77 Does this potential pivot solidify a specific type of
sovereign lens with which we should view tribes? And with the
form of sovereignty comes the question of what sort of immunity
from suit the tribes maintain. The courts have expanded and

74

Id at 480.
Michigan v Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US 782, 788 (2014).
76 Ablavsky, 80 Mont L Rev at 12 (cited in note 15).
77 See Herrera v Wyoming, 139 S Ct 1686, 1699 (2019) (observing that any “treaty is
‘essentially a contract between two sovereign nations’”), quoting Washington v Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 US 658, 675 (1979).
75
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contracted both tribal sovereignty and the corresponding immunity over the years, resulting in a lack of clarity as to whether they
may claim that immunity in in rem actions involving real property.
This Part seeks to clarify the fluctuations. Justice Anthony
Kennedy has said tribal immunity has “developed almost by accident”78 and “with little analysis.”79 Others have argued that the
doctrine is coherent as an “intentional byproduct of relationships
negotiated across centuries between the United States and the
. . . Indian nations.”80 This Comment argues that the actual origin
matters much less than the current status. Individual cases may
twist or turn, but the historical path has proceeded toward treating tribes as fully recognized sovereigns, unless Congress uses its
plenary power.
First, this Part explains the origins of tribal sovereignty and
notes where it stands today. Second, it establishes how tribes hold
land. Because this Comment’s purpose is to determine when
tribes may claim immunity from suits involving real property, a
broader understanding of what that real property looks like is
necessary. Third, it addresses tribes’ ability to regain sovereignty
over dispossessed land. Fourth, it explains the development of
tribal immunity, focusing on the larger trend of expansion. Fifth,
it recognizes the split that led to the Court’s hearing of Upper
Skagit Indian Tribe. Finally, it offers an overview of the legal and
policy concerns raised in that case.
This Part seeks to meld the doctrines related to tribal sovereignty, the development of tribal immunity, the history of tribal
land classifications, and the historical treatment of tribes to contextualize the proposed rule: tribal immunity should be unlimited
in real property disputes unless Congress acts.
A. The Current State of Tribal Sovereignty
Although much of federal Indian law seems subject to the
whims of whichever justices may be on the bench, one can discern
some basic rules of tribal sovereignty. The government’s view of
tribal sovereignty has mostly fluctuated between recognition of
tribal
independence
and
autonomy
and
reactionary
78

Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc, 523 US 751, 756 (1998).
Id at 757.
80 William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62
Am U L Rev 1587, 1594 (2013).
79
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condemnation of these same principles. Over time, however, the
reactionary efforts have been quieted by clearer legal recognitions
of sovereignty.
In 1831 and 1832, Chief Justice Marshall penned the two
opinions—Cherokee Nation v Georgia81 and Worcester v Georgia82—that have arguably had the greatest impact on how courts
conceptualize tribal sovereignty. The former established the foundation for treating tribes as “domestic dependent nations,”
likening tribes’ relationship to the United States to that of a
“ward to his guardian,” and ruled that the tribes “occupy a territory to which [the United States] assert[s] a title independent of
their will.”83 The Court disparagingly held that tribes are “so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States,
that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of
our territory, and an act of hostility.”84 The language is quite
damning for tribal sovereignty, but the Court walked back some
of it the following year in Worcester. After hearing a case regarding the constitutionality of a state statute criminalizing a nonNative person’s being on tribal land, Chief Justice Marshall ruled
that “Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time

81

30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831).
31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832).
83 Cherokee Nation, 30 US at 17.
84 Id at 17–18. Justice Smith Thompson dissented, arguing that tribes were a foreign
nation with “absolute sovereignty and self government” of their land. Id at 53 (Thompson
dissenting). Had he won the day, the question of tribal immunity for cases involving real
property may be much easier. Consider the following from Justice Thompson’s dissent:
82

The Cherokee territory being within the chartered limits of Georgia, does not
affect the question. When Georgia is spoken of as a state, reference is had to its
political character, and not to boundary; and it is not perceived that any absurdity or inconsistency grows out of the circumstance, that the jurisdiction and territory of the state of Georgia surround or extend on every side of the Cherokee
territory. It may be inconvenient to the state, and very desirable, that the Cherokees should be removed; but it does not at all affect the political relation between Georgia and those Indians. . . . If we look to lexicographers, as well as
approved writers, for the use of the term foreign, it may be applied with the
strictest propriety to the Cherokee nation.
Id at 55–56. If true, then the immovable property in question is not private property within
another sovereign, but rather a sovereign within another sovereign, and thus retains immunity from suit.
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immemorial.”85 The Court recognized the tribe as “a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries” that precluded Georgia law from applying to those within the reservation.86 The title of domestic dependent nation was far from
abrogated, but the Court did grant clearer, partial sovereignty to
the tribes.87
For over one hundred years, the Court engaged in a struggle
between stripping sovereignty through various means and returning some autonomy to the tribes.88 Eventually, however, the
Court began to embrace the concept of tribal sovereignty. Notably, the cases of the twentieth century were often rooted in analogies to state and foreign nation immunity. In one case, the Court
ruled that preventing the tribes from prosecuting “infractions of
tribal law would detract substantially from tribal self-government, just as federal pre-emption of state criminal jurisdiction

85 Worcester, 31 US at 559. The notion from Worcester that state sovereignty ends at
reservation borders has since been abrogated. See Nevada v Hicks, 533 US 353, 361–62 (2001).
86 Worcester, 31 US at 561.
87 There is a compelling legal history argument that Chief Justice Marshall actually
wanted to vindicate Cherokee rights all along. He dismissed Cherokee Nation on jurisdictional grounds, but he both hinted in his decision that a different case could result in victory for the tribe and also encouraged dissents. Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A
Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 Stan L Rev 500, 516 (1969). But his decision in
Worcester was not because of the sovereignty, laws, and rights of the Cherokee people;
rather, it was because the laws of Georgia were “repugnant to the [C]onstitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States.” Worcester, 31 US at 561. That is, while it may be true
Chief Justice Marshall respected Native sovereignty, he mostly sought to preserve federal
authority.
88 This Comment focuses on the current status of tribal sovereignty. The path to the
current doctrine is fraught with examples of governmental derogation of tribes. After Chief
Justice Marshall died, the Court acted at times as if tribes had never been sovereign. See,
for example, United States v Rogers, 45 US (4 How) 567, 572 (1846) (“The native tribes
who were found on this continent at the time of its discovery have never been acknowledged or treated as independent nations by the European governments, nor regarded as
the owners of the territories they respectively occupied.”). Meanwhile, the other branches
of the federal government actively sought to destroy tribal sovereignty through both seizure of property and pressure to deed land to the government. Wood, 62 Am U L Rev at
1637–38 (cited in note 80). During this period, the government committed to allotment,
before eventually retreating and trying to expand tribal sovereignty in the 1930s and
1940s. See text accompanying notes 110–12. In the 1950s and 1960s, the government reverted to antisovereignty policies and pursued a policy of termination. Through a series of
laws and decrees, the government ended the sovereignty of several tribes, granted states
rights over some tribal land, and forced tribe members to assimilate. See Michael C.
Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 Stan L Rev 1181, 1184–86
(1983). Congress has since repudiated anti-tribe policies and “committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination.” National Farmers Union Insurance Cos v Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 US 845, 856 (1985).
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would trench upon important state interests.”89 In another, the
Court required a “full record to be developed in the Tribal Court”
before bringing a civil claim over which a tribe has jurisdiction in
a federal court, enforcing a rule similar to the international legal
standard of exhaustion.90 The Court even recognized a “fundamental attribute of sovereignty”—the right to tax transactions occurring on trust lands—as “derive[d] from the tribe’s general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its
jurisdiction.”91 In addition, it reaffirmed that “a hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the power to exclude” non-Natives from that
very jurisdiction.92
Progress did not come without setbacks, but even these were
contextualized with an emphasis on sovereignty. Tribes were
found to lack “inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians.”93 However, they were deemed able “to prosecute nonmember
Indians” under their “inherent tribal authority.”94 Civil jurisdiction could not extend to all non-Indians on fee land,95 but did extend to “the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”96 Although these cases never directly involved
89

United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 332 (1978).
National Farmers Union Insurance Cos, 471 US at 856. See also Stephen W. YaleLoehr, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation in U.S. Courts, 13 Cornell Intl L J 351, 357 (1980) (“The International
Court of Justice has noted that ‘the rule that local remedies must be exhausted before
international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law.’”) (quoting Interhandel Case (Switzerland v United States), 1959 ICJ 6, 27).
91 Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 US 130, 137 (1982), citing Washington v
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 US 134, 152 (1980) (quotation
marks omitted).
92 Merrion, 455 US at 141.
93 Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191, 212 (1978).
94 United States v Lara, 541 US 193, 210 (2004). One reading of Lara could be that
the majority only ruled that Congress constitutionally authorized tribes to prosecute nonmember Natives. Id. The decision focused on interpreting a statute passed after Duro v
Reina, 495 US 676 (1990), in which the Court had found there was no inherent authority
to prosecute nonmember Natives. Id at 679. The statute in question, however, notes that
“the inherent power of Indian tribes” is “recognized and affirmed.” 25 USC § 1301(2). The
Lara majority, when confronted with whether Congress meant that the statutory power
comes from “inherent tribal sovereignty” or “delegated federal authority,” ruled “that Congress intended the former.” Lara, 541 US at 199 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks
omitted).
95 Fee land, or fee-patented land, is one of the three ways in which tribes hold land.
It is usually formally allotted land after the trust period has expired, or land that a tribe
has purchased but is not held in trust by the government. See notes 122–23.
96 Montana v United States, 450 US 544, 566 (1981).
90
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real property, they offer a glimpse into how the Court through the
years viewed the nature of a domestic dependent nation.
In recent years, the Court has reinforced the nature of Native
tribes as full sovereigns until altered according “to the will of the
Federal Government.”97 It considers the tribes as “remain[ing]
‘separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution,’” who are entitled to “historic sovereign authority.”98 It is safe to say that even
with the occasional setbacks,99 the Court seems determined to
treat tribes like their own sovereigns, not too different than one
of the several states or a foreign nation. Then again, differences
still do exist. As long as Congress maintains plenary powers over
the tribes, then the tribes can never be fully sovereign.100
B. Tribal Land Classifications
As seen with the immovable property exception above, much
of the concern over immunity is whether the land in question is
sovereign land or privately purchased land within another sovereign’s territory. Thus, with the state of tribal sovereignty established, an understanding of the land that tribes possess is necessary.
Southern states and Native tribes clashed during the early
years of the nineteenth century, culminating in the Indian Removal Act.101 The federal government proceeded to forcibly move
tribal members from their southern lands to reservations west of
the Mississippi.102 Eventually, however, the federal government
came after these lands reserved for the Native tribes as well.103
Beginning in the 1870s, Congress outlawed making treaties
with tribes and officially ceased recognition of tribal independence.104 In 1887, Congress passed the Indian General Allotment

97

Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 803.
Id at 788, quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49, 56 (1978).
99 See, for example, Cass County v Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 US
103, 113–14 (1998) (holding reservation land that was alienated but then reacquired is
now subject to state taxation); Carcieri v Salazar, 555 US 379, 394–95 (2009) (restricting
the ability of the secretary of the interior to acquire land in trust for tribes to only the
tribes existing at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act’s enactment).
100 For an analysis of this tension, see Lara, 541 US at 214–26 (Thomas concurring).
101 Pub L No 21-148, 4 Stat 411 (1830).
102 Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830–1976: The
United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the
Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DePaul L Rev 911, 931–34 (2002).
103 Id at 934.
104 Id.
98
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Act,105 which sought to grant reservation land to individual tribal
members and “extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation
boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians into the society
at large.”106 The Act “empowered the President to allot most tribal
lands nationwide without the consent of the Indian nations involved.”107 The allotments were held in trust by the US government for twenty-five years, and then issued to the holders as feepatented land.108 When the land was transferred to fee patent, the
owners of the lot were deemed to have “the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory
in which they may reside.”109 The policies of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries were an acknowledgement that
tribal sovereignty over these lands had existed and simultaneously an effort by the federal government to quash that sovereignty.
Eventually, the United States reversed course. In 1906, Congress statutorily perpetuated some tribal governments indefinitely,110 and then, in 1934, ended allotment through the Indian
Reorganization Act111 (IRA). The Act recognized the “inherent sovereign power” of Native tribes (but limited its reference to document adoption by the tribal governments) as well as ensured that
the constitutions of the tribes were not deemed invalid by any
other part of the statute.112 Most importantly, it extended the
trust relationship period over allotted land indefinitely.113 This
created checkerboard-like reservations,114 which had some lots of
land owned by the tribe, some lots of Native-owned fee-patented
land, some lots of allotted land held in trust by the federal government, and some lots of land owned by non-Natives.115
105

Pub L No 49-119, 24 Stat 388 (1887), codified as amended at 25 USC § 331 et seq.
County of Yakima, 502 US at 254.
107 Id.
108 25 USC § 348.
109 25 USC § 349.
110 Wood, 62 Am U L Rev at 1639 (cited in note 80).
111 Pub L No 73-383, 48 Stat 984, codified at 25 USC § 461 et seq. The purpose of the
Act was “to restore ‘the principles of tribal self-determination and self-governance’ that
prevailed before the General Allotment Act.” Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1653,
quoting County of Yakima, 502 US at 255.
112 25 USC § 476(h).
113 See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1653.
114 See John Collier, Office of Indian Affairs, 1934 Annual Report of the Commissioner
of the Office of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior 78, 80 (1934) (“While Congress
did not specifically direct the consolidation of Indian lands broken up and checkerboarded
with white holdings in the allotment process, it authorized such consolidation and set up
the machinery for it.”).
115 See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1653.
106
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The policies surrounding allotment and the IRA resulted in
the solidification of the three forms of tribal land today: reservations, trust land, and fee patents.116 Each form of ownership is
from a different type of acquisition and thus entail a different
bundle of rights.
The first two forms are referred to as “Indian Country,” which
includes the land within a reservation, dependent Native communities within the United States, and any non-extinguished allotments.117 Reservations are “geographically defined . . . areas over
which an [Indian tribal organization] exercises governmental jurisdiction so long as such . . . areas are legally recognized by the
Federal or a State government as being set aside for the use of
Indians.”118 This land can be diminished if explicitly intended by
an act of Congress, but otherwise its boundaries cannot be altered.119
Trust land is land purchased by the secretary of the interior
and then held in trust for the tribe, with the same legal exemptions as the reservation land.120 This category refers to land outside of reservation boundaries, and thus should be distinguished
from reservation land that is held in trust. The secretary has a
number of factors to consider when a tribe asks to purchase land
to hold in trust, including “the tribe’s need for additional land;
‘[t]he purposes for which the land will be used’; ‘the impact on the
State and its political subdivisions resulting from the removal of

116 See Mary E. Saitta, Note, The Power to Tax Is the Power to Foreclose: Reuniting
Law and Logic in Tribal Immunity from Suit, 60 Buff L Rev 225, 230–33 (2012) (explaining the differences between reservation land, trust land, and fee-patented land). It should
be noted that both trust land and fee patents can (and often do) exist within reservation
boundaries.
117 18 USC § 1151. The dependent Native communities can be in “original or subsequently acquired territory.” 18 USC § 1151.
118 7 CFR § 253.2.
119 See Solem v Bartlett, 465 US 463, 470 (1984) (citations and alterations omitted):

Our analysis . . . requires that Congress clearly evince an ‘intent to change
boundaries’ before diminishment will be found. The most probative evidence of
congressional intent is the statutory language used. . . . Explicit reference to cession or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal
interests strongly suggests that Congress meant to divest from the reservation
all unallotted opened lands.
The Court has recently reinforced this view. See Nebraska v Parker, 136 S Ct 1072, 1078–
79 (2016) (explaining that diminishment analyses should “start with the statutory text,”
then turn to “circumstances surrounding the opening of a reservation” and “‘unequivocal
evidence’ of the contemporaneous and subsequent understanding of the status of the reservation by members and nonmembers.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
120 25 USC § 465.
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the land from the tax rolls’; and ‘[j]urisdictional problems and potential conflicts of land use which may arise.’” 121
Finally, fee-patented land includes the formerly allotted land
after the trust period has expired,122 as well as any land simply
purchased privately by tribes.123
Because of the federal government’s historically derogatory
treatment of tribes and because the IRA did not address the issues around dispossessed land, much of this historically tribal
land is now outside of Native control. Many of the cases where
sovereign immunity will be most questionable may be centered on
various tribes’ buying back of land that was once their own.
C. Regaining Sovereignty Through Aboriginal Title
In rem disputes over real property will inevitably involve
each of the above classifications of land. But the federal government, through Indian removal and the diminishment of tribal
property, took most of the land that tribes owned. This, in turn,
has jeopardized the tribes’ claims of sovereignty. Three Supreme
Court cases have addressed the potential ability to regain that
sovereignty through the common law claim of aboriginal title.124
In Oneida Indian Nation of New York v County of Oneida125
(Oneida I), County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation of New York
State126 (Oneida II), and City of Sherrill v Oneida Indian Nation
of New York,127 the Court determined that sovereignty need not
be permanently lost due solely to the dispossession of land. At the
same time, the Court introduced some restrictions that will need
to be taken into account when determining whether tribes can
retain sovereign immunity over all of their land.
In Oneida I, the Oneida Indian Nation (OIN) brought a claim
that land conveyed in various treaties in the 1700s was done so
in violation of a number of statutes known collectively as the

121 City of Sherrill v Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 US 197, 221 (2005) (alterations in original), quoting 25 CFR § 151.10(f).
122 25 USC § 349.
123 See Saitta, 60 Buff L Rev at 232–33 (cited in note 116).
124 Aboriginal title is the common law doctrine that tribes maintain rights traditionally associated with sovereignty even after colonial takings of land and arises from “the
possessory rights of Indian tribes to their aboriginal lands.” Oneida Indian Nation of New
York v County of Oneida, 414 US 661, 667 (1974) (Oneida I).
125 414 US 661 (1974).
126 470 US 226 (1985).
127 544 US 197 (2005).
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Nonintercourse Act.128 In its decision, the Court ruled that it has
jurisdiction over the claim that “federal law now protects, and has
continuously protected from the time of the formation of the
United States, possessory right to tribal lands, wholly apart from
the application of state law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of possession.”129 A decade later, the
OIN brought a second suit claiming damages for the unlawful
conveyance of this land 175 years prior.130 The Court methodically
worked through a very complex issue, eventually permitting federal common law actions for possessory rights.131 This meant that
the OIN did not need a statutorily defined right for property actions, but rather could rely on the long history of the common law
supporting such actions.
The Court heard a third case involving the OIN twenty years
later, which has had the greatest impact on regaining sovereignty. In City of Sherrill, the Court revisited the same land at
issue in Oneida I and Oneida II but instead focused on the refusal
to pay property taxes on the land by the tribe. In an 8–1 decision,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recounted the history of the land
and the development of the aboriginal right to possessory
claims.132 The Court addressed the current composition of the
land: it was 99 percent non-Native, and the land had been sold to
non-Natives in 1807.133 The boundaries of the land lay within the
former reservation and thus the OIN argued that it maintained
an immunity from taxation, and the Second Circuit agreed.134 The
Supreme Court reversed, on what it saw as practical grounds:
“This long lapse of time, during which the Oneidas did not seek
to revive their sovereign control through equitable relief in court,
and the attendant dramatic changes in the character of the properties, preclude [the] OIN from gaining the disruptive remedy it
now seeks.”135 The Court made clear that its dismissal was only
in regard to equitable relief, applying the common law doctrine of
laches, or the unreasonable passage of time.136
128 Oneida I, 414 US at 664–65. The Nonintercourse Act, which forbids anyone but the
federal government from purchasing lands from Natives, remains codified. See 25 USC § 177.
129 Oneida I, 414 US at 677.
130 Oneida II, 470 US at 229–30.
131 Id at 233–36.
132 See City of Sherrill, 544 US at 203–11.
133 Id at 211.
134 Id at 211–12.
135 Id at 216–17.
136 City of Sherrill, 544 US at 216–19.
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Justice Ginsburg’s infamous analysis centers on what she
considered practicality. She worried that “the unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian sovereign control, even
over land purchased at the market price, would have disruptive
practical consequences.”137 In his concurrence, Justice David
Souter echoed these practical concerns, noting that “sovereign
status” is not only ascertained through “background law” but also
“the Tribe’s behavior over a long period of time.”138 While these
Justices framed their decisions as common sense, or even obvious,
many members of Native tribes have justifiably criticized the
opinion as “complicit in the denial of treaty-guaranteed property
rights, the denigration of tribal sovereignty, and the subordination of Oneida rights to the demands of the dominant society.”139
Having decided that the tribe “cannot unilaterally revive its
ancient sovereignty,”140 the Court recognized in dicta that 25 USC
§ 465 offered the exact remedy that the tribes were looking for:
revitalization, in trust, of previously tribal land and exemption
from taxation.141 Justice Ginsburg suggested application for trust
status is “the proper avenue for [the] OIN to reestablish sovereign
authority over territory last held by the Oneidas 200 years ago.”142
This may have established a presumption that tribes do not have
any sovereignty over these lands until Congress or the secretary
of the interior regrants it, meaning that these lands would likely
be deprived of immunity from suit as well. Justice John Paul Stevens, however, remained unconvinced, believing that the Court
violated the principles that only Congress may “diminish or disestablish a tribe’s reservation” and that a “tribe enjoys immunity
from state and local taxation of its reservation lands, until that
immunity is explicitly revoked by Congress.”143
City of Sherrill, while technically about remedies, contained
larger implications for sovereignty and immunity. Without sovereignty, there can be no immunity. If Justice Ginsburg’s logic—
that tribal sovereignty cannot be revived under certain

137

Id at 219.
Id at 222 (Souter concurring).
139 Allison M. Dussias, The Reports of Our Death Are Greatly Exaggerated—Reflections on the Resilience of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 2018 BYU L Rev 1231,
1275 (2019).
140 City of Sherrill, 544 US at 203.
141 Id at 220.
142 Id at 221.
143 Id at 224 (Stevens dissenting).
138
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circumstances and after a certain amount of time—is extended to
prohibit the revival of sovereignty for lands dispossessed in less
extreme ways and for shorter amounts of time, then tribes’ claims
of immunity may be fruitless. Oneida II provides some hope for
tribes to retain sovereignty long after they lost their land; a viable
solution to the scope of tribal immunity in real property suits
must reconcile this hope with the implications in City of Sherrill.
D. Development of Tribal Immunity
When not extinguished or expired, tribal sovereignty has generally moved away from the initial ward-guardian relationship
toward an expansive right, and so too has tribal immunity. The
first potential glimpse of tribal immunity emerged in 1850, when
the Taney Court ruled that the Cherokees were “in many respects
a foreign and independent nation” and “governed by their own
laws and officers.”144 While the Court never explicitly mentioned
sovereign immunity, it did note that “a public officer, acting for
his government” cannot be sued for his actions.145
The Court did not address tribal immunity for nearly another
seventy years. In Turner v United States,146 Justice Louis
Brandeis recognized that the Creek Nation “exercised within a
defined territory the powers of a sovereign people.”147 He then
ruled, however, that it was “not the immunity of a sovereign to
suit, but the lack of a substantive right to recover the damages
resulting from failure of a government or its officers to keep the
peace” that caused there to be no possible avenue for liability
against the tribe.148 Thus, while it may be a mistake to call Turner
the foundation of tribal immunity, it has become “a slender reed
for supporting the principle.”149 The Court, citing Turner, finally
did give a full-throated backing to tribal immunity in 1940:

144 Parks v Ross, 52 US (11 How) 362, 374 (1850). This case was decided only four
years after the decision discussed above in Rogers, see note 88, emphasizing the fickle
nature of the government’s treatment of tribal sovereignty.
145 Parks, 52 US (11 How) at 374.
146 248 US 354 (1919).
147 Id at 355.
148 Id at 358. He also ruled the US Government had “not impose[d] any liability upon
the Creek Nation” and, because the US Government was an indispensable party, “objected
also to the jurisdiction of the court over it.” Id at 358–59. In this regard, there were many
more issues than possible common law tribal immunity at play.
149 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 523 US at 757.
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The public policy which exempted the dependent as well as
the dominant sovereignties from suit without consent. continues this immunity even after dissolution of the tribal government. These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without
Congressional authorization. It is as though the immunity
which was theirs as sovereigns passed to the United States
for their benefit, as their tribal properties did.150
This was the Supreme Court’s broadest decision on tribal immunity to date and would remain the only decision for almost
forty years.151 First, the case established tribal sovereignty as a
fundamental aspect of the trustor-trustee relationship that the
US government had created with the tribes.152 Second, the Court
extended tribal immunity even to tribes whose governments had
dissolved. This observation calls into question Justice Ginsburg’s
dicta in City of Sherrill that likens a loss of sovereignty to a loss
of land. Considering both a government and land are fundamental aspects of sovereignty, it could follow that if losing government
alone is not enough to lose sovereignty, then neither is losing
land.153
From then on, the Court acted as if tribal immunity were a
given. It cited only three cases—Turner, United States v United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co,154 and Puyallup Tribe, Inc v Department of Game of Washington155—to claim that “Indian tribes
have long been recognized as possessing the common-law

150 United States v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 309 US 506, 512 (1940)
(citations omitted). The Court also cited an Eighth Circuit case, which appears to be the
first published record of tribal immunity. See Thebo v Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F 372,
375 (8th Cir 1895) (ruling that the Choctaw, while “not a sovereign state,” has been placed
“on the plane of independent states” for the majority of suits, and that a “state, without
its consent, cannot be sued by an individual”).
151 See Wood, 62 Am U L Rev at 1653–54 (cited in note 80).
152 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 309 US at 512.
153 Of course, obvious counterarguments emerge. First, the OIN was absent from the
land at issue in City of Sherrill for two centuries. This certainly distinguishes it from a
tribe that may have only recently lost its government. Many Native nations, however, are
absent from land for periods of time because of past actions by the US government. Penalizing their sovereignty due to colonial acts by the federal government is potentially as
problematic as stripping them of sovereignty due to the recent dissolution of a government.
Second, land could be considered more important than government for sovereignty purposes. This may be a compelling argument for some, but there is no objective ranking of
requirements of sovereignty, and many sovereign nations may differ on which traditional
aspects they hold to be more important.
154 309 US 506 (1940).
155 433 US 165 (1977).
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immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”156
In this regard, Justice Kennedy appears correct when he says the
doctrine is almost accidental and lacking in analysis. But the
origin (or lack thereof) of the doctrine has not stopped its growth.
Tribal immunity has held steady, encompassing any situation
where the tribe is the “real party in interest.”157
With this continuous affirmation and occasional growth,
tribal immunity is now certainly the law of the land. Indeed, the
Court can safely now say “an Indian tribe is subject to suit only
where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived
its immunity.”158 Through its plenary powers, Congress can limit
or abrogate any form of sovereign immunity at any time, and even
has done so for some forms of tribal immunity in a limited manner.159 More often, however, Congress has “reiterated its approval
of the immunity doctrine.”160
Furthermore, the Court has developed its justification for
this deferential attitude over the years. “[T]ribal self-sufficiency
and economic development” has left the Court “not disposed to
modify the long-established principle.”161 Justice Kennedy critiqued this rationale and noted “reasons to doubt the wisdom of
perpetuating the doctrine,” which “might suggest a need to abrogate tribal immunity,” but still voiced the Court’s deference “to
the role [of] Congress.”162 In doing so, the Court found “instructive
the problems of sovereign immunity for foreign countries” because it “began as a judicial doctrine” like tribal immunity and
extended to “virtually absolute immunity” until Congress created
“more predictable and precise rules.”163
The Court did not make a definite endorsement of treating
tribes the same as foreign nations. But one could infer from the
156

Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 58.
See Lewis v Clarke, 137 S Ct 1285, 1289 (2017) (holding an employee of a tribe
acting in the scope of his employment is not immune from suit because he, “not the tribe,
is the real party in interest”).
158 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 523 US at 754.
159 See, for example, 18 USC § 1162 (authorizing states to assume jurisdiction over
offenses committed by or against Natives in Indian territory located in Alaska, California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin). To do this, however, Congress must ensure
that the waiver “be unequivocally expressed.” Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 58 (quotation
marks omitted).
160 Oklahoma Tax Commission v Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 US 505, 510 (1991).
161 Id (quotation marks omitted).
162 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 523 US at 758.
163 Id at 759 (quotation marks omitted).
157
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Court’s language that absent explicit congressional notice, tribal
immunity can at least be considered similar to the foreign state
immunity prior to the FSIA. In turn, such an analogy would mean
the immovable property doctrine’s applicability is entirely up in
the air. This is because before the FSIA, the applicability of the
immovable property exception was entirely determined by executive discretion. And while tribal immunity is not subject to executive determinations in the same way that foreign nation immunity had been before the FSIA, it is subject to a different branch’s
control—the plenary powers of Congress. Like the Court’s deference to State Department rules, a deference to Congress’s refusal
to restrict the comity that provides tribal immunity may be the
most legally sound path. That being said, legal soundness is not
the only consideration at stake; as seen in Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Souter’s opinions in City of Sherrill, the Court has treated
the sovereign status of tribes as a so-called practical, rather than
purely legal, matter. This Comment seeks to make the case that
the legally sound path of broad tribal immunity, with deference
to Congress to adjust, is also quite practical—it places tribes in
control of their immediate destiny, while allowing Congress to
legislate as it sees fit.
E. Uncertainty Before Upper Skagit Indian Tribe
In County of Yakima, the Court justified the difference between the government’s inability to collect a tax on the sale of
tribal land and the ability to collect a tax directly on the land itself
with an in personam and in rem distinction.164 As the case was
one of statutory interpretation, the Court derived its holding
solely from a textualist analysis of the General Allotment Act.165
Despite the limited nature of the case, this decision caused a state
court and circuit court split to emerge on the broader issue of sovereign immunity. Courts wrongly began using County of Yakima
to provide a framework for analyzing tribal immunity in cases regarding land versus those merely involving land. Some jurisdictions found immunity in both in rem and in personam cases, while
others held that only in personam cases had such protection. Certain in rem actions are forbidden by law. For instance, one cannot

164
165

See County of Yakima, 502 US at 268, 270.
See note 9.
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claim adverse possession against a reservation.166 But that tells
us nothing about other in rem claims over real property and little
about tribal immunity in claims against other tribal landholdings. Lower courts, meanwhile, have been split.
The Second Circuit differentiated between sovereign authority and sovereign immunity, regardless of the type of land: “While
the tax exemption of reservation land arises from a tribe’s exercise of sovereignty over such land, and is therefore closely tied to
the question of whether the specific parcel at issue is ‘Indian reservation land,’ a tribe’s immunity from suit is independent of its
lands.”167 Such a distinction meant that although the tribe could
be taxed on the non-reservation land, the tribes were immune to
foreclosure because the type of land matters not for immunity.
Notably, this suit dealt with the same land as City of Sherrill,
suggesting that immunity from suit may in fact be distinguished
from equitable bars.168 A few years later, the same circuit “decline[d] to draw the novel distinctions—such as a distinction between in rem and in personam proceedings” that it was asked to
draw.169 In doing so, the circuit made clear that tribes have a
“common-law [ ] immunity from suit—as opposed to immunity
from other, largely prescriptive, powers of the states such as the
levying of taxes.”170
State courts, on the other hand, have been split on whether
the type of action is relevant. The Supreme Court of New Mexico
found “no meaningful distinction between in rem and in personam
claims . . . [b]ecause tribal sovereign immunity divests a court of
subject matter jurisdiction.”171 A Wisconsin Court of Appeals
panel saw the concern as a policy issue, arguing that “allowing in
166 See United States v 7,405.3 Acres of Land in Macon, Clay, and Swain Counties, 97
F2d 417, 422 (4th Cir 1938):

The determinative fact is that the federal government has assumed towards
[this tribe] the same sort of guardianship that it exercises over other tribes of
Indians, from which it results that their property becomes an instrumentality of
that government for the accomplishment of a proper governmental purpose and
may not be taken from them by contract, adverse possession, or otherwise, without its consent.
167 Oneida Indian Nation of New York v Madison County, 605 F3d 149, 157 (2d Cir
2010) (citation omitted), vacd and remd, 562 US 42 (2011).
168 This is undetermined, as the decision was vacated and remanded by the Supreme
Court because the tribe waived its sovereign immunity, making the point moot. See
Oneida Indian Nation of New York v Madison County, 665 F3d 408, 424–25 (2d Cir 2011).
169 Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v Seneca County, 761 F3d 218, 221 (2d Cir 2014).
170 Id (emphasis in original).
171 Hamaatsa, Inc v Pueblo of San Felipe, 388 P3d 977, 985 (NM 2016).
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rem claims against tribal property to proceed ‘would simply circumvent tribal sovereign immunity[,] allowing taking of tribal
property’” and deeming this result to “be contrary to one of the
primary purposes of sovereign immunity—protecting tribal treasuries.”172 In contrast, the North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed
on policy grounds, noting that “[t]he Tribe has not cited any case
holding that tribal sovereign immunity bars an in rem condemnation action in state court”173 before bemoaning the potentially
“far-reaching effects on the eminent domain authority of states
and all other political subdivisions” if the court were to grant immunity.174 The concern was that tribes could use their immunity
from suit to “acquire veto power over any public works project attempted by any state or local government merely by purchasing
a small tract of land within the project.”175
F.

The Unresolved Case of Upper Skagit Indian Tribe

This winding road led to Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, but the
case resulted in three different opinions that only muddied the
water. Unlike some cases previously discussed, the issue at hand
involved not statutes or treaties but rather common law property
principles. While the majority refused to offer a solution, the legal
concerns from Justice Thomas’s dissent and the policy concerns
from Chief Justice John Roberts’s concurrence must be considered when crafting a solution to the unanswered question of tribal
immunity’s applicability to real property disputes.
The case began when Sharline and Ray Lundgren filed a
quiet-title action, invoking adverse possession against land recently purchased by the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe. The tribe in
turn claimed sovereign immunity as a defense.176 The Washington
Supreme Court rejected the defense, citing to County of Yakima
as ruling that “sovereign immunity does not apply to cases where
a judge ‘exercises in rem jurisdiction’ to quiet title in a parcel of
land owned by a Tribe, but only to cases where a judge seeks to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over the Tribe itself.”177 The
172 Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources v Timber and Wood Products Located
in Sawyer County, 906 NW2d 707, 721 (Wis App 2017) (alteration in original).
173 Cass County Joint Water Resource District v 1.43 Acres of Land in Highland Township, 643 NW2d 685, 691 (ND 2002).
174 Id at 694.
175 Id.
176 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1652.
177 Id (emphasis omitted).
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Supreme Court held this to be in error but also remanded to the
Washington Supreme Court to determine if immunity should apply.178 But the question remains unresolved: the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe quitclaimed the land to the Lundgrens before the case
was taken back up.179
Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion is rife with judicial restraint and barren of guidance for lower courts. He dismissed the
Washington Supreme Court’s analysis as “error,” determining
that “Yakima did not address the scope of tribal sovereign immunity” but rather was a case solely devoted to determining the
“tax consequences of [the] checkerboard” caused by allotment.180
After a detailed discussion of County of Yakima, Justice Gorsuch
avoided deciding the actual case before him.
After the initial briefings, the Lundgrens changed their approach, and instead suggested the immovable property exception
barred the tribe’s sovereign immunity claim, regardless of
whether County of Yakima applied.181 The majority decided that
the argument was introduced too late and preferred “the Washington Supreme Court to address these arguments in the first
instance.”182
Justice Thomas, however, embraced the immovable property
exception. His dissent can be contrasted with Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion in City of Sherrill. She leaned heavily on practical restrictions of tribal sovereignty; Justice Thomas portrayed his
opinion as grounded in a long history of legal theory. To him, the
Court should have quickly “resolved this case based on the immovable-property exception to sovereign immunity,” which he
claimed “plainly extend[ed] to tribal immunity, as it does to every
other form of sovereign immunity.”183 But Justice Thomas did not
cite a single case where the exception was applied to tribes. The
only cases he discussed in detail were those dealing with foreign
nation immunity. In doing so, he claimed the foreign nation cases
warranted “deference to the political branches” due to their “sensitive questions,” but that they “do not suggest that courts can
ignore longstanding limits on sovereign immunity, such as the

178
179
180
181
182
183

Id at 1652, 1655.
Oertwich v Traditional Village of Togiak, 413 F Supp 3d 963, 969 (D Alaska 2019).
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1652, 1653.
Id at 1653–54.
Id at 1654.
Id at 1657 (Thomas dissenting).

2020]

Tribal Immunity in Real Property Disputes

1635

immovable-property exception.”184 Likewise, to Justice Thomas,
the Court has a “judicial duty” to determine the applicability of
tribal immunity.185 This contorts the truth, however, that the
Court has had a history of ignoring the immovable property exception in deferring to the executive branch.186
The dissent reads like a historical dissertation. Justice
Thomas cited treatises from the seventeenth century, restatements from the twentieth century, and years of caselaw in between. He explained that this doctrine is a corollary to a conflict
of laws doctrine know as lex rei sitae, which holds that the law of
a land is governed by the law of whatever sovereign governs
where the land is situated.187 He refuted the idea that sovereign
immunity applies to in rem property disputes in US law, noting
that “property ownership is not an inherently sovereign function”188 and Supreme Court precedent has “expressly
acknowledge[d] the immovable-property exception.”189
Justice Thomas argued that tribes have limited sovereignty,
and only are afforded “the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”190 While he had previously called into question the source and nature of tribal sovereignty,191 he seemed resigned to precedent in this decision. The
common law immunity afforded to tribes is not greater than that
afforded to other sovereigns, meaning that if any common law–
protected sovereigns are subject to the exception, then tribes
must be too.192 He dismissed the argument that sovereignty of
tribes “is not coextensive with that of the States”193 by saying that,
even if true, this cannot mean that their sovereignty is “more expansive” than that claimed by the states—or the federal
184

Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1662 (Thomas dissenting).
Id. Justice Thomas’s desire to come to a decision is reminiscent of his general philosophy in federal Indian law. He has expressed a desire “to reexamine the premises and
logic of our tribal sovereignty cases” and a disdain for the Court’s failure “to confront these
tensions, a result that flows from the Court’s inadequate constitutional analysis.” Lara,
541 US at 214–15 (Thomas concurring).
186 See text accompanying notes 66–70.
187 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1658 (Thomas dissenting).
188 Id at 1660 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Permanent Mission of India to the
United Nations v City of New York, 551 US 193, 199 (2007).
189 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1660 (Thomas dissenting).
190 Id at 1661 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 58.
191 See Lara, 541 US at 215 (Thomas concurring).
192 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1661 (Thomas dissenting).
193 Id (emphasis and quotation marks omitted), quoting Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma,
523 US at 756.
185
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government, for that matter.194 In so claiming, Justice Thomas
completely ignored the fact that there are distinctions that do
make tribal immunity broader than other forms of immunity—
such as the lack of implied waiver for tribes.195
The conclusion derided tribal immunity, with Justice Thomas
repeating the oft-stated expression that it “developed almost by
accident” and claiming it “does not reflect the realities of modernday Indian tribes.”196 He invoked the Framers, noting that they
“would be shocked to learn that an Indian tribe could acquire
property in a State and then claim immunity from that State’s
jurisdiction.”197 His thesis is simple: “The Government’s unconvincing arguments cannot overcome more than six centuries of
consensus on the validity of the immovable-property exception.”198
But his six centuries of consensus was actually an ahistorical account of foreign nations—a qualifier he clearly did not assign to
tribes. He can only point to treatises and theoretical applications
of the exception to foreign state immunity in support of his claims;
he ignores the history of the United States’ hesitation in applying
the immovable property exception with those nations; and he conflates foreign-nation and tribal immunity, despite clear evidence
that they have different scopes.
In contrast to Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts joined
the majority in full, but he wrote separately to express a distinct
policy concern. His reasoning displays remarkable similarities to
Justice Ginsburg’s practical concerns from City of Sherrill, while
still showing sympathy to Justice Thomas’s legal argument. His
concurrence focused on “[w]hat precisely [ ] someone in the
Lundgrens’ position [is] supposed to do.”199 That is, tribes must be
amenable to suit, “otherwise a tribe could wield sovereign immunity as a sword and seize property with impunity, even without a
194

Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1661 (Thomas dissenting).
See Thomas P. McLish, Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible
Limits, 88 Colum L Rev 173, 179–80 (1988) (citations omitted):
195

[C]ourts consistently hold that a tribe’s immunity can be waived only by its express consent or the consent of Congress. In contrast to other governments, implied waivers are generally not recognized. . . . Tribal immunity is, therefore,
broader in this respect than is the immunity possessed by states, the federal
government and foreign countries.
196 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1662 (Thomas dissenting) (quotation
marks omitted).
197 Id.
198 Id at 1661.
199 Id at 1655 (Roberts concurring).
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colorable claim of right.”200 He then critiqued the solutions proposed by the tribe.
The first suggested solution was that the parties engage in a
bargain “toward a sensible settlement” after the Lundgrens admit
to not being able to bring a suit against them.201 Chief Justice Roberts dismissed this as “not a meaningful remedy,” but does not
explain why.202 One could assume this to be akin to a holdout
problem.203 “The Tribe bought the property with an eye to asking
the federal government to take the land into trust and add it to
the existing reservation next door” and discovered via a survey
that the land was improperly tracked.204 The Lundgrens “purchased their property long before the Tribe came into the picture,”
but a recent survey revealed a boundary line dispute between
their property and the tribe’s new purchase.205 The actual cost of
settling this dispute could be massive, considering the Lundgrens
had a strong desire to keep their land and the tribe had a strong
desire to regain its land. Moreover, if the tribe were to have immunity from suit, it would have no incentive to bargain and could
likely price out the Lundgrens, even if its own valuation was not
that high. Government intervention may be necessary to mitigate
costs.206
The second solution was for the Lundgrens to provoke the
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe into suing the couple and waiving its
own immunity.207 Chief Justice Roberts, however, remained
“skeptical that the law requires private individuals—who, again,
had no prior dealings with the Tribe—to pick a fight in order to
vindicate their interests.”208
Chief Justice Roberts ended by saying the decision of the
Court may be “intolerable.”209 He admitted that the immovable
property exception is “a settled principle of international law,”

200

Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1655 (Roberts concurring).
Id.
202 Id.
203 See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L Rev 1, 4 (2006)
(“Potential sellers, knowing that their individual properties are each necessary for the
entire project, could ‘hold out’ in order to obtain an inflated price.”).
204 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1652.
205 Id at 1655 (Roberts concurring).
206 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 17 (1960).
207 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1655 (Roberts concurring).
208 Id.
209 Id.
201
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and that the only question this case presents “is whether different
principles afford Indian tribes a broader immunity from actions
involving off-reservation land.”210 Although content with leaving
the question unanswered for now, he worried that if the state
court does extend sovereign immunity to encompass “non-trust,
non-reservation property,” then the doctrine would “need to be
addressed in a future case.”211
The legal implications of the dissent and the policy implications of the concurrence are no different than the concerns embedded in tribal sovereignty more generally. Are courts to apply
some corpus of defined legal rules to determine the scope of domestic dependent nations? And if yes, which rules should be in
the corpus? Should they be concerned with the policy implications
at stake? This debate should help to resolve the indecision of Upper Skagit Indian Tribe.
III. THE NEARLY UNLIMITED SCOPE OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY
Where can we find the answer to the “grave question?”212
With the next in rem claim on tribal land, courts will only know
that County of Yakima does not apply. This Comment argues
tribes should retain immunity in all real property cases unless
Congress has limited that right. Such a baseline withstands the
relevant legal tests and is firmly grounded in the notion that
tribes are simultaneously their own sovereigns and domestic dependent nations subject to Congress’s control. With that baseline,
however, comes the more radical claim: tribes should also never
be considered subject to the immovable property exception, no
matter the type of property in question. If both arguments are
accepted, then the scope of tribal immunity in cases involving real
property is currently unlimited, but subject to change by congressional action.
First, this Part explains why the question of the scope of
tribal immunity should be considered absolute unless Congress
intervenes. Second, it refutes the applicability of the immovable
property exception. Third, it clarifies how this solution avoids the
policy issues suggested by Chief Justice Roberts.

210
211
212

Id.
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1656 (Roberts concurring).
Id at 1654 (majority).
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A. The Grave Answer: Deference to Congress
Tribal sovereignty has had twists and turns, but the general
trajectory can be described as toward treatment similar to that of
other sovereigns, with the caveat that Congress may abrogate its
protections at any time.213 Indeed, the Court has continuously
found tribes have kept “their historic sovereign authority” absent
congressional action.214 Justice Thomas, on the other hand, laments that this precedential caveat “untenably hold[s] both positions” of tribal sovereignty and nonsovereignty.215
The caveat, however, is not untenable. First, it is the fundamental meaning behind domestic dependent nation. Tribes are
not part of the several states, so the Eleventh Amendment does
not constitutionally protect their common law immunity.216 It can
assuredly be taken from them at any moment. Tribes are not foreign nations, so the FSIA does not supplant whatever immunity
they have retained. Second, the plenary power over the tribes’ immunity is not starkly different than the Court’s previous deferrals
to executive branch determinations of who to hale into court preFSIA. The executive branch consistently issued orders to grant
absolute immunity to foreign nations, even when acting as private parties through land acquisition or possession. It was due to
the significant importance of foreign relations, as Justice Thomas
notes, that such immunity persisted, rather than due to any
judge-made rules. This deference-based rule existed in the background until an act of Congress altered it, rather than a shift in
judicial opinion. Even when the State Department did not negotiate with a particular country in a given suit, the court turned to
State Department precedent. While the executive branch deals
with foreign affairs, Congress did have authority to change the
relationship. Meanwhile, Congress alone deals with Native nations. Just as it had the ability to qualify the protections to foreign

213 Independent of Justice Thomas’s issues with this caveat, discussed below, Congress’s ability to abrogate the immunity may just appear quite large at first glance. In
actuality, however, it is analogous to Congress’s expansive powers to control the jurisdictional limits of any lower federal court. See Henry M. Hart Jr, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev 1362,
1365 (1953) (“Congress has plenary power to distribute jurisdiction among such inferior
federal constitutional courts as it chooses to establish.”).
214 Michigan v Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US 782, 788 (2014).
215 United States v Lara, 541 US 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas concurring).
216 See note 42.
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nations, Congress must have the ability to alter tribal immunity
through its plenary control.217
Indeed, the contrast of judicial versus legislative powers is
clear when looking at the legal evolution of tribal immunity. Since
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, the Court has never limited a tribe from claiming it. Justice Thomas’s dissent in Upper
Skagit Indian Tribe was the first time anyone on the Court had
suggested any exception to tribal immunity. The reason is simple:
it is not the Court’s role to apply such an exception. In Kiowa
Tribe of Oklahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc,218 the
Court explicitly noted that it prefers to “defer to the role Congress
may wish to exercise in this important judgment,” rather than
decide for itself whether to limit tribal immunity.219 Justice
Thomas suggested that the Court did recently refuse to extend
immunity beyond the norms of the common law, but a decision
not to extend is quite different than a decision to actively limit.220
In the case he cited, the Court refused immunity for a tribal member; but, of course, individual members of any sovereign do not
have immunity unless acting on behalf of the sovereign.221
Congress has, in fact, occasionally invoked its plenary powers
over tribal immunity. It responded to Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma
by considering “several bills to substantially modify tribal immunity” before adopting a “far more modest” bill that only applied
to limited contract cases.222 And Congress has not only refrained
from total abrogation of tribal immunity; it has expressly preserved tribal immunity on occasion.223 Justice Elena Kagan wrote
that any judicial action that expresses an opinion restricting the
scope of sovereign immunity “would scale the heights of presumption” by “replac[ing] Congress’s considered judgment with our
contrary opinion.”224 Indeed, the “rights that exist are not created
by Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of certain

217

Id.
523 US 751 (1998).
219 Id at 758.
220 See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1661 (Thomas dissenting), citing Lewis
v Clarke, 137 S Ct 1285, 1292 (2017).
221 See Lewis, 137 S Ct at 1291–93.
222 Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 801–02.
223 See, for example, 25 USC § 5332 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as
. . . affecting, modifying, diminishing, or otherwise impairing the sovereign immunity from
suit enjoyed by an Indian tribe.”).
224 Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 803.
218
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limitations of power.”225 They are rights of sovereignty itself, and
their source is found in an implied agreement by Congress’s inaction.226 The very fact that Congress has so clearly invoked its limiting abilities before suggests that extending beyond those invocations would be a violation of this implied agreement.
Finally, the federal government’s long history of subjugating
tribal sovereignty and theft of tribal land greatly weigh in favor
of a policy of deference. As both the trustee who should be acting
in the best interests of the tribes and as a politically accountable
unit, Congress should be forced to carry the burden of determining whether to restrict tribal immunity.227 It may rule to strip this
broad immunity, but it is and should be within its power—not the
courts’—to decide if that is best for tribes.228
B. The Inapplicability of the Immovable Property Exception
Since tribal immunity is absolute absent congressional action, the only other exceptions that should prevent tribes from
claiming it could be judge-made rules like the immovable property exception. The exception only applies to land and property
permanently attached to that land, so any discussion of whether
the exception should apply must be analyzed through the lens of
each type of tribal land.
To start, reservation land should not be subject to the exception. First, it is not privately acquired by the tribe. It is established by the United States and only diminishable by Congress.
Second, the land is largely outside the jurisdiction of state law
and subject to some federal regulations designed with self-

225
226

Kawananakoa v Polyblank, 205 US 349, 353–54 (1907) (emphasis added).
See Nevada v Hall, 440 US 410, 416 (1979), citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 US

at 136.
227 See Addison W. Bennett, Comment, Partially Tribal Land: The Case for Limiting
State Eminent Domain Power under 25 USC § 357, 86 U Chi L Rev 945, 976 (2019) (arguing that “[a]ny taking of Native American land by a state government requires a discussion
of whether such a scheme would be in the interest of justice considering the history of
tribal lands”).
228 In certain circumstances, such as in exercising its eminent domain powers, Congress must choose whether it is acting as the fiduciary or the superior sovereign. To do so,
the Court has adopted a test, in which it asks whether the government is making a good
faith effort to exchange the tribal land for full value. See United States v Sioux Nation of
Indians, 448 US 371, 408–09, 416 (1980), citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation v United States, 182 Ct Cl 543, 553 (1968). An applicable adaptation here
would be whether Congress, by revoking tribal immunity in a real property suit, is making
a good faith effort to ensure the tribe will maintain full value of the land.
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government in mind.229 These two aspects allow reservation land
to circumvent the immovable property exception. From the early
explanations of the immovable property exception to today, the
fundamental reasoning behind the exception is that “property
ownership is not an inherently sovereign function.”230 The exception does not arise because of the sovereign itself, but because the
sovereign has acquired land elsewhere—and engaged in private,
rather than sovereign activity. As a result, reservation land is obviously not under the exception.
Land held in trust through 25 USC § 465 should also avoid
the exception. The land is purchased by the secretary of the interior, and then transferred to be held in trust for the tribes. The
dicta in City of Sherrill makes clear that the acquisition “provides
the proper avenue for [tribes] to reestablish sovereign authority
over territory.”231 With the reestablishment of sovereign authority
comes “the immunity which was theirs as sovereigns” because
such immunity was “passed to the United States for their benefit.”232 In other words, the fiduciary relationship of the United
States and the tribes mandates that the trust land be treated in
the best interest of the tribes, which naturally preserves sovereignty and immunity.
Finally, even land held in fee should not be considered subject
to the exception. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in City of Sherrill
only narrowly holds that equitable relief from ancient sovereignty
claims can be barred by laches.233 Sovereign immunity is not a
form of equitable relief, but a jurisdictional bar.234 Thus, while the
dicta suggests sovereignty over certain land may be regained only

229 It could be argued that the land is occasionally subject to state control due to Public Law 280. See 18 USC § 1162(a) (granting certain states jurisdiction over “offenses committed by or against Indians in [specified] areas of Indian country”). See also note 159;
Nevada v Hicks, 533 US 353, 361–62 (2001) (“‘Ordinarily,’ it is now clear, ‘an Indian reservation is considered part of the territory of the State.’”). Nevertheless, “[t]hat is not to
say that States may exert the same degree of regulatory authority within a reservation as
they do without.” Id at 362. Indeed, Public Law 280 makes explicit some of the limitations:
“Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any
real or personal property . . . belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe that is held in
trust by the United States.” 18 USC § 1162(b).
230 Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v City of New York, 551 US 193,
199 (2007).
231 City of Sherrill, 544 US at 221.
232 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 309 US at 512.
233 See City of Sherrill, 544 US at 221.
234 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v Meyer, 510 US 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.”).
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through a 25 USC § 465 acquisition, the inverse that it is extinguished on fee land cannot necessarily be assumed.235 Rather, the
Supreme Court has made clear that tribes retain immunity “even
after dissolution of the tribal government,” implying traditional
aspects associated with sovereignty need not always be present.236
Even if true, the land is certainly a private purchase by a sovereign—just the type of land acquisition to which the exception is
meant to apply. The question would therefore be best solved by
analogy. Should courts find tribes similar to states, thus enforcing
the immovable property exception, or should they instead invoke
foreign nations, and cede authority to a different branch?
The Court has already alluded to an answer. Because “tribes
were not at the Constitutional Convention,” the immunity from
suit must be differentiated from state immunity, as the Convention is where the “mutuality of . . . concession” was contemplated.237 For foreign nation immunity, on the other hand, the
“Court consistently has deferred to the decisions of the political
branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on
whether to take jurisdiction.”238 Such deferential decision-making
is entirely in line with the way in which courts have treated tribes
in recent years.239 The difference is that the State Department
consistently gave orders to not bring foreign nations into domestic
courts. Congress has not done so; but its silence in the face of
other limitations on tribal immunity is unambiguous.240 Congress
explicitly limited the scope of foreign nation immunity with the
FSIA because of inconsistent judgments that resulted from various State Department rules. Unless Congress disambiguates
tribal immunity, as it has on occasion, then there is no reason to
assume a tribe’s private actions should be subject to exceptions.

235 That being said, Justice Ginsburg herself would likely not read her decision in
such a manner. She has repeatedly questioned the very existence and depth of sovereign
immunity. See Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 832 (Ginsburg dissenting) (anticipating that “immoderate, judicially confirmed immunity” will not have “staying power”).
236 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 309 US at 512.
237 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 523 US at 756 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in
original), quoting Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak, 501 US 775, 782 (1991).
238 Verlinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 486 (1983).
239 See, for example, Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 788 (“[U]nless and ‘until
Congress acts, the tribes retain’ their historic sovereign authority.”), quoting United States
v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 323 (1978).
240 See text accompanying notes 222–26.
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C. Avoiding Tribal Immunity’s Sword
If, as posited, Justice Thomas’s legal argument fails, then the
question whether tribes retain immunity in cases involving real
property must focus on policy, not law. A court should only find a
way around permitting the application of immunity if it is demanded by an adequate, equitable solution, such as what Justice
Ginsburg was apparently aiming for in her opinion in City of
Sherrill. The courts have often weighed the tribe’s ability to protect its autonomy (and typically its treasury) against its ability to
seize land at will and avoid suit. Situated within this balancing
test is Chief Justice Roberts’s concern in Upper Skagit Indian
Tribe; that is, that tribes would purchase land at will and then
wield sovereign immunity like a sword. And while these concerns
may be warranted, there is no clear reason to avoid applying sovereign immunity only because of them. Once again, it is easiest to
address the arguments for each type of land in turn.
Chief Justice Roberts does not mention reservation land
when voicing his concerns, perhaps because the facts of the case
did not require it. Regardless, because Congress alone creates and
diminishes reservations, there can be no apprehension of using
sovereign immunity as a sword. Individual tribes may have lobbying power to try to acquire reservation land, but the absence of
actual acquisitional power makes it functionally impossible for
them to seize land at will solely to claim tribal immunity.
Trust land is equally immune from these concerns. Tribes
cannot seize land with impunity in hope of acquiring immunity
from suit; instead, tribes can only request that the secretary of
the interior purchase land into trust on their behalf. In the process, they will know that the several factors discussed above must
be considered if they wish to regain sovereignty.241 These guidelines prevent the very issues proposed by Chief Justice Roberts,
while maintaining the social and economic benefits of tribal
immunity.
It may be argued that regardless of this governmental check,
tribal immunity could actually hurt the tribes economically. Individuals and businesses may worry about being able to vindicate
their rights if an overly broad protective rule is in place.242 That
241

See text accompanying note 121.
See Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Self-Determination in the Age of Scarcity, 54 SD L
Rev 398, 416 (2009) (“Although the historical rationale for broad tribal immunity, tribal
economic development and self-sufficiency, has sustained tribes’ recent forays into diverse
242
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is, people may be disincentivized from interacting with tribes if
they do not know they can be compensated if they suffer a loss or
injury. Inversely, if tribes were to have their immunity unilaterality limited by the government, they may be able to attract more
social and economic interactions. But such an argument patronizingly ignores the fact that US courts are not the only remedial
path; instead, litigants can find justice in equally viable tribal
courts in which many tribes have already waived much of their
immunity.243 Even if a tribe has not waived its immunity, it is disingenuous to say the tribe’s economic benefit is a fundamental
part of tribal immunity, but then decide the tribe itself may not
determine how to achieve that benefit.244
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts was explicitly worried about
fee land. Many may agree with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Ginsburg that if tribes could simply snatch up new land and claim
immunity, then there would be several “disruptive practical consequences.”245 If a tribe were to purchase new land at market price
and then claim immunity from suit, it could wield its immunity
as a sword. But from a legal standpoint, the denial of immunity
“is not only inequitable, but also irreconcilable with the principle
that only Congress may abrogate or extinguish tribal sovereignty.”246 And from a policy standpoint, with Congress’s plenary
powers over the tribes, Chief Justice Roberts’s concerns are somewhat fantastical. A mere piece of legislation can change this rule,
as it has for foreign nations and tribes in the past; a judicial decision would be overreaching and irreconcilable with centuries of
jurisprudence on tribal immunity. Until Congress creates “more
predictable and precise rules,” the courts must abide by the foundational law of sovereign immunity at its peak.247

commercial activities, a rigid, inflexible assertion of tribal immunity in these endeavors
can present a threat to those harmed by a recalcitrant tribe.”).
243 See Struve, 36 Ariz St L J at 155–61 (cited in note 25) (surveying the remedies
against tribes and mentioning tribal waiver of immunity from suit in a tribe’s own courts).
244 See Angela R. Hoeft, Coming Full Circle: American Indian Treaty Litigation from
an International Human Rights Perspective, 14 L & Ineq 203, 257 (1995) (“The international paradigm of indigenous self-determination suggests an inverse set of presumptions:
Native peoples must be presumed competent to evaluate their own needs within the context of the larger society, and non-natives must be presumed incompetent to make decisions regarding Native well-being.”) (emphasis in original).
245 City of Sherrill, 544 US at 219.
246 Id at 226 (Stevens dissenting).
247 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 523 US at 759.
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CONCLUSION
The Court hesitated to establish a standard for tribal immunity for real property disputes—but its preference for passing the
buck to another court, rather than creating a standard, should be
condemned. The power to determine the scope of tribal immunity
in US courts has always remained exclusively with Congress, and
the Court should recognize this. With the recent confirmation in
cases like Sharp v Murphy248 and McGirt v Oklahoma249 that substantial portions of Oklahoma have been part of Indian country
for decades,250 a decision on in rem jurisdiction for tribal immunity cases is needed sooner rather than later. Unless tribal immunity is firmly established, the very nature of a tribe’s sovereignty—
not to mention its landholdings and possessory rights—will be
constantly threatened.
This Comment seeks to establish that tribal immunity in in
rem actions is absolute and should remain so unless Congress
acts. This immunity is subject to congressional regulation, but
such a feature is inconsequentially distinct from foreign state immunity, where deference was given to the State Department until
the legislative branch stripped them of that discretion. Furthermore, tribal land has never been subject to the immovable property exception, and there is no clear policy reason for judges to
suddenly change course. Any concerns over this scope are not for
the courts to decide. That power starts and ends with the Native
tribes and Congress.

248

2020 WL 3848060 (US).
2020 WL 3848063 (US).
250 See id at *7 (“Today we are asked whether the land these treaties promised remains an Indian reservation for purposes of federal criminal law. Because Congress has
not said otherwise, we hold the government to its word.”).
249

